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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1356 
___________ 
 
RODERICK BLACK, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FAIRTON FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:16-cv-01553) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 29, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 20, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In relation to his role as the leader of drug ring in Ahoskie, North Carolina, from 
November 1991 through January 1994, Roderick Black was convicted by a federal jury 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and distributing cocaine and crack 
cocaine; engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. § 848; using and 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime; possessing crack 
with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting; distributing crack and aiding and 
abetting; possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting; and 
distributing cocaine.  He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life in prison and 60 
months.  The judgment was affirmed on appeal.  United States v. Black, No. 95-5077, 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24447, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 18, 1996). 
 In 2001, Black filed his first motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge the 
judgment.  A district court denied the motion as untimely, and a court of appeals declined 
to issue him a certificate of appealability.  United States v. Black, 19 F. App’x 78, 79 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  He has since sought relief without success in a petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, see Black v. Warden, 253 F. App’x 209, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), 
additional § 2255 motions, see, e.g., Black v. United States, No. 2:94-CR-15-BO-9, No. 
2:14-CV-35-BO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132929 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2014), and a motion 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), see Black v. United States, No. 2:94-CR-15-BO-9, No. 2:14-
CV-35-BO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147391 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2014) (order). 
 In 2016, Black returned to the District Court with another petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, claiming “actual innocence” of a sentence in light of Burrage v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).  In that case, the Supreme Court explained, in pertinent 
part, that the “death results” sentencing enhancement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) “is an 
3 
 
element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887.  (This enhancement increases the mandatory minimum and 
maximum sentences when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of [the 
controlled substance in question].”  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C).)  According to Black, 
his sentence was enhanced in violation of Burrage because the District Judge made a 
drug-quantity finding (specifically, Black stated that he was sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum of life imprisonment based on a District Judge’s finding that 49.4 kilograms of 
cocaine were involved in a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841).   
 The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction after detailing 
Black’s earlier efforts to win relief from his criminal judgment and concluding that 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 was not an inadequate or ineffective vehicle for raising Black’s Burrage 
claim.  Black sought reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  Black appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).1  
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing Black’s habeas 
petition, see Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam), and we review the District Court’s order denying his motion to reconsider for 
abuse of discretion, see Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 
237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).  In reviewing each of these orders, we examine the District 
Court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard and the District Court’s factual 
                                              
1  Black does not need a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal.  See 
United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on 
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012). 
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findings under a clearly erroneous standard.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538 (discussing 
review of order dismissing habeas petition); Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc., 602 F.3d at 
246 (discussing review of order denying reconsideration).  Upon review, we will 
summarily affirm because this appeal does not present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 As we have previously explained, “§ 2255 must be used to raise a challenge to the 
validity of a [federal prisoner’s] conviction or sentence unless that section is ‘inadequate 
or ineffective.’”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002); see 28 
U.S.C. § 2255(e).  The “inadequate or ineffective” exception applies in rare 
circumstances only, such as when a federal prisoner had “no prior opportunity to 
challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law could 
negate with retroactive application.”  Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 
119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997)).  A § 2255 motion is not inadequate or ineffective 
merely because relief under § 2255 was previously denied or the federal prisoner cannot 
meet the gatekeeping requirements for filing a second or successive § 2255 motion.  
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  “It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to 
use it, that is determinative.”  Id. at 538. 
 We agree with the District Court that this case is not one of the rare instances 
where § 2255 would be inadequate or ineffective.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burrage did not decriminalize the conduct for which Black was convicted.  Rather, as 
relevant to Black’s case, Burrage merely applied Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
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(2000), and one of Apprendi’s progeny, Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  
See Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887.2  We have previously held that a § 2255 motion is not an 
inadequate or ineffective vehicle for raising an Apprendi-based argument.  See Okereke, 
307 F.3d at 120-21.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that Black could 
not resort to § 2241 to raise his legal claim, and the District Court did not err in denying 
his motion to reconsider.3 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
                                              
2 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490.  In 
Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the same rule applies to “facts that increase 
mandatory minimum sentences.”  133 S. Ct. at 2163. 
 
3 Even if the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Black would not be 
entitled to relief under Burrage.  Black does not challenge a finding of death or serious 
bodily injury; he takes issue with a drug-quantity finding.   
